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Techniques are described herein for preventing Media Access Control (MAC) 
address spoofing attacks based on the two-step onboarding process for open Service Set 
Identifiers (SSIDs) due to Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) override after the Internet 
Protocol (IP) address is learned. These techniques leverage Opportunistic Wireless 
Encryption (OWE) and an access token to provide a secure channel between the wireless 
network and the client. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Wireless client onboarding and segmentation through open Service Set Identifiers 
(SSIDs) require the client to join a base Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) associated 
with the SSID, acquire an Internet Protocol (IP) address to proceed with web authentication, 
and then change VLANs based on the type of service/policies that need to be applied. The 
change of VLAN involves changing subnetworks after the client has already acquired an 
IP address on the base VLAN. Current solutions for VLAN override after Web Layer 3 
(L3) Authentication are brittle and require disassociating the client while retaining the 
client state on the wireless controller for some time while awaiting client rejoin. The Media 
Access Control (MAC) address of the client is used to fetch the state of the client without 
an additional re-authentication, which potentially allows for MAC address spoofing attacks. 
Accordingly, techniques are presented herein which leverage Opportunistic 
Wireless Encryption (OWE) to provide a secure channel between the wireless network and 
the client. During the authentication procedure, a results page from the portal returns a 
secure token as part of a new Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) header. The token is 
2
Choukir et al.: SECURE WIRELESS CLIENT ONBOARDING AND SEGMENTATION
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2019
 2 5837 
supplied during rejoin through the same HTTP header to the portal, which skips the 
credential request based on the validation of the token. 
Universally Unique Identifiers (UUIDs) version 4 variant 1 as defined in Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments (RFC) 4122 are leveraged for the 
token. Furthermore, a new Access_token HTTP header is added. Browsers may be 
requested to store and return cookies to improve seamlessness on the client side. 




This solution prevents MAC address spoofing attacks after client de-authentication 
upon VLAN override, providing an additional level of security to the VLAN override 
functionality. These techniques also integrate seamlessly into the web authentication 
process. 
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The solution may be further enhanced by extending OWE to at least perform Access 
Point (AP) - side certificate validation. This may be similar to operations currently 
performed by the browser based on pre-installed root chains. 
If OWE is not required, the solution may still apply by requiring HTTP Secure 
(HTTPS) during the web authentication process. The procedure for generating the token 
and validating on the portal may remain the same, but the secure channel mechanism may 
change. 
This solution is also compatible with other Layer 2 (L2) authentication procedures 
(e.g., dot1x, Pre-Shared Key (PSK), etc.) because the access token is provided during the 
web authentication phase. 
In summary, techniques are described herein for preventing MAC address spoofing 
attacks based on the two-step onboarding process for open SSIDs due to VLAN override 
after the IP address is learned. These techniques leverage OWE and an access token to 
provide a secure channel between the wireless network and the client. 
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